War on Analogies
How to use Russia's history to better understand its present and future
No political debate is complete without analogies drawn from history. That’s particularly true when the debate involves international relations. And if there’s a war, analogies fly like bullets.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it’s a good time to think about the use and abuse of historical analogies in contemporary decision making.
A few days ago, a former high-ranking British military officer discussed the situation in Russia on the BBC. He noted that the Russian army has been battered and the Russian economy is plunging, but he cited “the capacity of Russians to take pain, historically.” He didn’t specify the history he was thinking of. He didn’t have to.
During the Second World War, Russia suffered horribly, yet Russians struggled on for almost four savage, grinding years. Their capacity to take pain was indeed immense.
It’s a compelling analogy. But never forget that all events are unique. As Heraclitus said, no man ever sets foot in the same river twice “for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.”
Russian tanks may be crossing the plains of Ukraine again – or may be stuck in the mud of the plains again -- but this is not the Second World War. And the situation today differs in blatant ways: Russia was not invaded. Russian civilians are not being slaughtered and Russian cities are not being razed. Russians do not face a future of slavery or extermination if they lose. All these differences suggest Russians in the current war may be somewhat less prepared to take pain than they were in 1943.
And the Second World War is only one instance in which Russia’s military and its population suffered pain. What might we find if we go looking for other analogies?
There’s the First World War, obviously. Lots of pain there but Russians were somewhat less prepared to endure it. Hence the Revolution of 1917.
Then there is “the first Russian Revolution” in 1905. At the beginning of the 20th century, Czarist Russia experienced widespread social unrest. In the far east, Czar Nicholas took a hardline with Japan, a new and rising power. Japan struck first in the war but Russia was expected – not least by Russians -- to easily crush the upstarts (who were, after all not white. Kaiser Wilhelm’s letters to his cousin on the subject are an early indicator that Europe was not in the best of hands). Instead, Russia suffered a string of losses. The world was shocked. Russia was humiliated. The latent social unrest grew into widespread labour strikes and military mutinies. The Czar was forced to create a multi-party Duma and a new constitution.
Even less evidence of capacity to take pain there.
So how are analogies like these used? Typically, people don’t bother to investigate the history. Instead, they draw on the history they happen to know and have top-of-mind. (See Daniel Kahneman’s “WYSIATI,” or “What You See Is All There Is.” So many mistakes could be caught simply by remembering that what we see is not all there is.) That’s why the Second World War is such a staple in political arguments. It’s not that it’s the best analogy. In fact, it seldom is. The Second World War was – happily – an extremely unusual event. But it’s the event we all know from movies and documentaries, so it gets top billing.[1]
This is obviously misguided. It’s like trying to understand Austria and Austrians by looking at history’s most famous Austrian, Adolf Hitler. He’s not an average specimen.
If we are not to fall into the trap of salience, we must venture forth and investigate the history. Learn new stuff.
But then what? Say you learn that in 1905, Russia’s autocratic leader, facing unrest at home, took a hardline in a conflict with a foreign power, got into a war Russia was expected to win easily, but was instead humiliated – stop me when this starts to sound familiar – and this spawned civil insurrection that forced the autocrat to grant major political concessions. And say you decide this is much closer to the situation today than any other analogy you can dig up. What should you do with this analogy? Should you conclude that the debacle in Ukraine will soon inspire civil unrest that endangers Putin’s regime?
Lots of people would. That’s how we typically use analogies: Find one you feel is close to the present situation and conclude that the present situation will probably unfold something like that.
I think that’s a mistake. There are indeed similarities between the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the former happened 118 years ago. A few things changed in the meantime.
So let me suggest a very different way to use historical analogies.
Get one. You can even start with something from the Second World War. But dig into the history and get another. And another. And more.
Then compare and contrast. What is it about the first analogy that is similar to what is happening now? How is it different? What do these similarities and differences suggest about how the present will unfold in future? Do the same with the second analogy. And the third. Keep going until you exhaust yourself.
Do that and you won’t get pat answers about what’s coming. But you will gradually develop a finer appreciation for the curves and contours of the current situation.
It’s like the old parable of the blind men groping an elephant. One man feels the trunk and says the creature is “like a thick snake.” Another touches the ear and thinks it is like a fan. A third touches a leg and says it’s like a tree trunk. A fourth touches the tusk and declares it like a spear. Each is correct. But each knows only a little of the reality. Only when the various perspectives are combined can they get close to the truth. (There are lots of variations of this parable, by the way. It is ancient and appeared in many different Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain texts.)
This approach is related to that which Philip Tetlock and I advocated in Superforecasting: Seeing problems from multiple perspectives and integrating what each perspective reveals into your judgement. Phil’s seminal research shows that not only helps us see reality more clearly, it leads to demonstrably more accurate expectations of how that reality will unfold in the near future.
This sort of on-the-one-hand-on-the-other approach won’t make you a rock star on Twitter. And you will never become a TV talking head doing that. But it can help you make a little more sense of this bewildering world, and that’s not nothing.
[1] Another standard is Vietnam, for the same reason. Every diplomatic effort that is supposed to be too generous is Munich; every military operation that could go wrong is Vietnam. When you hear Munich or Vietnam in contemporary debates it’s highly likely you’re in the presence of someone who knows little history. Or thinks the audience does.
When the attacks of 9-11 came as a bolt out of the blue, I recall numerous analogies to Pearl Harbour. A comparison both irrelevant and dangerous all at the same time.
Good article. I enjoyed reading it very much. It certainly got me thinking. Mark Twain once said, "history doesn't repeat itself, but people often do—for better or for worse". I think this is the case people clothe themselves in analogies to justify their own actions. We imagine we are fighting the Soviet Union, Putin thinks he's the new Czar. Both are wrong and dangerous illusions.
Analogies about Russia today are mostly made to the Soviet Union, which for those of us "blessed" with being able to read and listen to Russian and had to listen through Putin's speeches we know this is not the case. Imagining this is the Soviet Union is wrong.
Putin has covered himself in the mantle of being the heir of the Czarist state, glorifying and even sanctifying the last Czar. This is much more dangerous than the Soviet State as the Czar's economy was backward in the extreme and there was little in the way of industry and development. What information we have indicates half the children died before becoming adult, a tiny minority could read and generally the infrastructure was non-existent for most of the country.
Russia was unable to defend itself under the Czar which was bad enough but it was also constantly making trouble for the rest of Europe. The Soviet Union had some economic development, mostly thanks to their ability to take the risk of getting loans and technical expertise from the West to develop their economy. The Czar was too afraid of foreign influence to dare.
30 years after the Fall of the Soviet Union even the economy starts to look like it did under the Czars. Industry is wiped out except for oil and gas. The Russian state now is highly dependent on the revenues from its ownership of several oil and gas corporations. The governments revenue is 39% from this source and the Russian economy owes 25% of its GDP solely to this sector (Mitrova & Melnikov, 2019). Europe is also highly dependent on the delivery of those resources, roughly 40% of gas and 25% of oil is Russian. In turn, Russia is highly dependent on the European market, taking just over 50% of its oil and gas (Rauhala, Noack, & Guinan-Bank, 2022).